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Introduction
There is a strong temptation to explain Russian foreign policy -  with its perpetual 
accent on state-centrism, national interests, hard security concerns, and ostensible inclination 
to the spheres of influence politics -  as based upon the traditions of Realpolitik. The Kremlin’s 
accentuation of the idea of multipolarity, one of the pivotal concepts of the realist thinking, 
seems to confirm this view. Indeed, it were neorealists who “have predicted a fairly rapid 
transition to multipolar balancing” (Mastanduno and Kapstein 1999: 12) as a constellation of 
presumably self-sufficient power centers that either check and balance, or clash with each 
other.
When the concept of multipolarity was initially introduced in the Russian political 
vocabulary in mid-1990s, it boiled down to political resistance to the American hegemony by 
means of redistributing world power in favor of those few actors able to challenge the U.S.-led 
unilateralism. However, being elevated to the status of dominating policy strategy of Moscow, 
the idea of multipolarity faces a number of questions raised basically by academic scholars 
and almost completely ignored by political elites. One of them is the potentially higher 
volatility and conflictuality of multipolar systems in comparison to unipolar and bipolar ones -  
an argument which has realist and neorealist pedigree. Thus, some Russian commentators 
consider that it is the decline of U.S. global power which sharpened a number of regional 
conflicts across the globe. Arguably, multipolarity may be conducive to further destabilization 
in the Middle East, strengthening of Iran, military advancement of China and North Korea, etc. 
(Kulagin 2007: 50) Therefore, “the probability of conflict is high in multipolar systems due to 
shaky alliances and diffuse power-relations. And it is in multipolar systems that we can 
historically observe the highest frequency of power-maximizing behaviour” (Toft 2005: 401). 
In other words, multipolarity presupposes divides and clashes between a number of “poles” 
which might be stronger than -  and possibly inimical to -  Russia. “Those Russians who are 
eager to achieve multipolarity should be ready to face the new rising centers of power”, a 
Russian author convincingly claims and then continues: “There are absolutely no guarantees 
that in a world with unbalanced power centers Russia would be able to successfully pursue a 
policy of balanced equidistance” (Tsymburskiy 1999: 151). Against this background, 
multipolarity may contain serious obstacles for international institution-building and the 
concomitant logic of collective action. Besides, the idea of Russia’s self-sufficiency which 
accompanies the realist reading of multipolarity has domestic implications as well: some 
Russian commentators dub it a “dangerous misconception” conducive to eventual 
militarization of Russian economy (Aidamirov 2010: 86). Along these lines, multipoilarity could 
be equated with a “conceptual virus” launched by the West for laying foundation for Russia’s 
declining positions in the world (Ananchenko 2001).
The Russian debate on multipolarity reaches far beyond the domain of Realpolitik. It is
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my thesis in this paper that Russian policy- and opinion-makers, having indeed borrowed the 
concept of multipolarity from the (neo)realist vocabulary, very often use it in a much broader 
sense of narratives on Russian identity and subjectivity, and therefore attach to it quite 
different non-realist meanings, which include issues of identity and non-state actorship. This 
plurality of interpretations becomes obvious as soon as one unpacks the voluminous layers of 
Russian literature on international relations which are hardly known to the Western readership 
and stay beyond the academic analysis of Russian foreign policy which in the West 
traditionally is based upon quite a limited number of key speakers (president, prime minister, 
foreign minister, etc.). As I am going to show further, what hides beneath the pretended 
realist wording of Russian discourse is a much more complicated and variegated -  though not 
always consistent -  set of policy imageries. Against this background, the Russian discourse 
on multipolarity reminds a patchwork of scattered and loosely tied “mental maps” (Kildiushov 
2006: 159), based upon -  and sustained by -  certain visions of the world in the diversity of its 
actors.
In this paper I am going to trace the discursive trajectories of the multipolarity concept 
through the prism of the idea of resignification as understood by and developed in critical 
theories where it denotes the transformative practice of deploying terms in previously 
unexplored or even “unauthorized” contexts. Resignification is mostly used by political agents 
located at the margins of political structures who wish to change the previous meanings by 
either expanding the concepts or by including other meanings in them (Schippers 2009: 80­
91). This appears to be applicable to Russia which painstakingly makes efforts to avoid 
marginalization and raise its world profile by promoting and propagating the structural 
changes in international society to foster greater plurality of power holders and diversification 
of their resources.
Resignification is closely related to the concept of language games that seems to be 
equally appropriate for my research as well. Following the logic of Wittgenstein, language has 
neither ontological stability nor unity; consequently, there is no authoritative, determinate 
collective “we” which would appeal to a mental or metaphysical source of identity or authority, 
or unveil “literal, uninterpreted truth”. The language games approach claims that each political 
concept we use under a closer scrutiny decomposes into a series of “pictures” of reality; 
henceforth, it is “playful and fluid” (Schippers 2009: 49) contexts of political discourses that 
ought to be studied. It is due to language games that political queries are called to examine 
particular features of the world which bring into questions the issues of well established 
identities (Robinson 2009: 12-13). Of course, not all language games translate into strong 
political voices that explain how to change the world, yet at least some of them provide 
different “road maps” to the future.
For application of the concept of resignification it is worthwhile to remind that in the 
West the idea of multipolarity appeared as a key component of academic discourse and 
developed mainly within the frameworks of (neo)realist discourse. What is peculiar in the 
Russian interpretations of multipolarity is that it emerged as explicitly political concept, and 
reached beyond realist discourse by extending to the issues of identity and culture. The time
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frames also differ: in the Western world the multipolarity discourse appeared in the midst of 
the Cold War, while in Russia this concept was reactualized in mid-1990s, and is usually 
associated with the rise of Evgeniy Primakov to the posts of Russian Foreign Minister and 
then Prime Minister of Russia.
1. Russia’s Critique of the Concept of Multipolarity
There are several ways of using the interrelated concepts of resignification and 
language games for multipolarity studies, all of them illuminating meaningful deviations from 
the previously dominating Realpolitik vision of the world.
Firstly, in the realist reading, multipolarity used to be an ostensibly state-centric 
concept. In its more contemporary and reconsidered visions, it may contain important non­
state conceptualizations. One of them is the so called civilization-based approach which, as I 
will show below, comes to the surface as soon as we unpack the concept of multipolarity. 
Another example is the idea of Russia as an empire-in-the-making, which -  despite its 
seemingly national-patriotic connotations -  represents an attempt to reach beyond purely 
state-based imageries by adapting the idea of empire to a cosmopolitan milieu (Martyanov 
2009: 51-66). For the Russian Left, one of the most important global non-state institutions is 
World Social Forum (Kagarlitskiy 2006) as an embodiment of the growing plurality of actors 
within a post-unipolar international society, etc.
Secondly, in the traditional realist sense power is mostly material and physical 
phenomenon (exemplified by nuclear arsenal and energy resources in case of Russia) and 
does not always need strong social underpinning. Yet some interpretations of multipolarity to 
be presented in this paper do recognize non-material types of power, since the very concept 
of the pole, apart from material resources, requires social content that is well addressed in 
non-realist theories, including social constructivism. It is the multiplicity of social resources 
that increasingly defines the concept of the pole. In case of Russia, three social factors seem 
to be of special importance. To be a pole is a matter of recognition by others rather than self­
proclamation. Next, to be recognized as a pole, a country is supposed to possess soft power 
which comes in two versions: as a power of mental attraction of its developmental model, and 
as a source of normative appeal. Then, to qualify for a role of a pole, a country needs to 
invest these soft power resources and test them in its neighborhood policies with the view of 
forming a social milieu that is, on the one hand, existentially comfortable, and, on the other, 
has to globally manifest the ability to come along with most immediate neighbors.
Thirdly, for classical realists multipolarity is a rather pessimistic concept heralding 
conflicts and instability. In the Russian political parlance, multipolarity, on the contrary, 
embodies an optimistic worldview, based upon a “just” distribution of power among a variety 
of poles. In Realpolitik terms, multipolarity is basically about maintaining order, for a variety of 
post-realist discourses it is mostly about the management of diversity in the world which does 
not any longer constitute an agglomeration of nation states. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov’s statement that “the 500-year long domination of the West, based upon universality of 
its norms, is coming to an end” seems to reveal Russia’s eagerness to get adjusted to and 
even foster the plurality of actors, interests and practices within the emerging international
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society (Lavrov 2010). This makes a significant part of Russian discourse quite compatible 
with those critical theories that make strong emphasis on the issues of “hybridity” and 
“polivocality” in international relations (Lenz and Dallmann 2007: 5). “The world of 
singularities” and “the plurality of beginnings as a ‘world-forming’ experience” (to borrow a few 
words from Jean-Luc Nancy) repudiate the world of states and focus on “human beings, 
cultures and nations” as bearers of diversity and plurality in international society. Against this 
background, Moscow’s verbal rejection of the balance-of-power language may testify to 
Russia’s wish to rhetorically break with the Cold War legacy for the sake of voicing 
“democratic disagreement” against solidarist versions of a West-based “general will” 
(Schwartz 1995: 10).
The interpretation of multipolarity as diversity management can be instrumental in 
unveiling its stark dissimilarity with other discursive strategies employed by the Kremlin, first 
of all with President Medvedev’s proposal on a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture with its 
emphasis on a unified institutional space cemented by common rules and joint procedures of 
collective security building, as opposed to its regional fragmentation and differentiation. In 
other words, regionalization of security landscape -  quite an expectable corollary of 
multipolarization -  is hardly compatible with a liberal-idealistic scenario of normative 
coherence “from Vancouver to Vladivostok”. This tension between two different approaches 
not only reflects the conceptual gap between pluralist and solidarist types of international 
society. It also may shed some light on the nature of Russia’s disagreements and 
miscommunication with the West which are, of course, not reducible to a simplistic 
contradistinction between Russian sympathies to a pluralist political milieu, on the one hand, 
and Euro-American determination to project Western norms on a global scale, on the other. 
Since both Russia and the West may use both pluralist and solidarist strategies, it is quite 
imaginable that in some situations (as, for example, in the post-Soviet era) it is the West that 
prefers a more pluralist international environment, while Russia may sympathize with unitarist 
/ solidarist scenarios.
Fourthly, most of the neorealist literature is rather skeptical about the post-Cold War 
prospects of NATO-based security infrastructure. Should Russia strongly adhere to the realist 
interpretation of international order, it won’t keep demonizing NATO; on the contrary, it would 
have joined the chorus of those realist voices that predicted the eventual dissociation of the 
North Atlantic alliance in the absence of the Soviet Union. It was realists who “expected 
Western order to crumble in the face of declining American power capabilities” (Deudney and 
Ikenberry 1999: 124). Yet for many Russian supporters of multipolarity NATO still is the most 
powerful instrument of the U.S. hegemony which tends to further expand to the detriment of 
“Russian interest”.
Fifthly, Russia consistently attacks one of the key preconditions of the realist mindset
-  the idea of anarchy which the Kremlin seeks to overcome and substitute with a more 
institutionalized and inclusive type of relations, as exemplified by Medvedev’s proposal on the 
new security architecture in Europe. Anarchy appears to be the pivotal structural problem for 
those Russian authors who make sense of multipolarity as a structural condition laying 
foundation for a greater coordination of major powers’ policies, either in the form of a new 
“concert”, or within the framework of global governance.
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Sixthly, for realism the social world can be divided into false and true dispositions 
(Chernoff 2002: 192), which seems to inspire its Russian followers to succumb to almost 
ritualistic references to "real processes”, "objective interests”, and "genuine state of affairs”, 
as divorced from "ideological” and "politicized” approaches. Therefore, the "correspondence 
to reality” appears to be the key realist argument (Monteiro and Ruby 2009: 31). Thus, having 
claimed that the unipolar world ceased to exist right after August 2008, as a result of Russia’s 
military victory over Georgia, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, declared the "reality” 
of multipolar world as a fait accompli. Being initially conceived as an academic concept, 
multipolarity thus has gradually transformed to almost a "fact” of the being, if not an axiom 
that needs neither proofs nor further problematization. This type of simplistic reasoning 
corresponds to the realist tradition which rests upon "an ontological position that claims that 
objects exist even if no one is conscious of them or experiences them” (Jeffrey 2008: 55). The 
basic problem with this approach is that it leaves unanswered the question of how we can 
know for sure that a certain concept is "true” or "real” (Wendt 1999: 59). The realist approach 
can only be feasible if based upon the presupposition of the ontological existence of a 
presumably all-knowledgeable subject potentially able to distinguish "real-life processes” from 
"virtual” or faked. The Russian state sometimes indeed tends to think of itself as this kind of 
"super-subject” and, consequently, the source of hegemonic discourse.
Yet some voices in Russian academia argue that multipolarity does not constitute an 
established reality (Martynov 2009) -  perhaps, the same way as unipolarity didn’t do so 
either. Following the vocabulary of Alexander Wendt, multipolarity can be better seen as an 
example of "social systems” or "social kinds” (Wendt 1999: 376) which give meaning to ideas. 
Therefore, one may presume that there might be more than one model of multipolarity that 
may either correlate or compete with each other -  hence the idea of "multipolarity in plural” 
which gave the name to this paper. Indeed, "reality might not be working according to one 
logic, (and there is -  A.M.) the possibility of the existence of more than one truth 
simultaneously” (Sarvary 2001: 381). Hence, there may be "simultaneously existing social 
realities where it might not be possible to claim that one is superior to the other” (Sarvary 
2001: 381), and the plurality of interpretations of reality translates in multiplicity of Russia’s 
foreign policy role identities that are hardly describable in the traditional for realism terms of 
"status quo” and "imperial” powers (Wolfers 1962: 84). Russia may display both "imperial” and 
"status quo” characteristics simultaneously, a situation which seems to be consonant with the 
constructivist understanding of poles as not ‘given’ subjects but constantly constructed in 
inter-subjective "games of recognition”.
Yet Russia’s critique of unipolarity, in spite of its ubiquity, was never coherent and 
conclusive, and consists of a collection of arguments loosely tied together. One of them is 
Russia’s deplorable exclusion from the U.S.-led world order. What the West baptized a "new 
international community” turned -  in the Russian eyes -  to a club-like "consolidation of well 
developed democracies” (Bogaturov 1999: 28) that claimed to incarnate an allegedly 
indisputable perspective for the entire mankind. Consequently, all "non-Western” countries 
were expected to catch up with the Western core under the guise of the "expansion of 
democracy” concept. The NATO intervention in the Balkans, in the minds of most Russian 
analysts and policymakers, gave a perfect example of the imposition of Western rules on 
neighboring territories.
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The second argument against unipolarity, as exposed by Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev, points to its potentially divisive nature ending up with the "bloc-based approaches” 
(Medvedev 2008a) which Russia attributes to the Cold War nefarious heritage. In result, 
unipolar domination is conducive to the formation of alternative groups of allied states aimed to 
resist the domination of the core power(s) -  a situation which might be dubbed "contested 
unipolarity” (Halliday 2009: 39).
A third argument points to the ability of the unchecked U.S. global power to manipulate 
the policies of other countries regardless of their size, from Georgia to Russia. In line with the 
tenets of conspiracy theory, a Russian author deems that it was due to the United States skillful 
strategy that Russia was left with no other choice in the Caucasus than to go to war against 
Georgia and then recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia. According to this reasoning, the most 
negative effects of the August 2008 war for Russia were envisioned by the U.S., including 
Moscow’s military involvement in the conflict with Tbilisi and consequent diplomatic isolation 
due to the recognition of the two break-away territories (Manoilo 2009: 91-112). Thus, in this 
(mis)interpretation, the alleged unipolarity is equivalential to Russia’s loss of its own subjectivity 
and its degradation to the role of an object for external manipulations.
Yet there is another argument against unipolarity that does not seem to be in harmony 
with any of the three critical points introduced above, since it deduces the drawbacks of 
unipolarity not from the undue strength of the United States but rather from the inability of this 
country to properly perform its leadership functions due to lack of resources (Maksymychev 
2000: 55). Therefore, the main trouble stems not from America’s power, but on the contrary -  
from its inherent weakness and incapability to achieve its aims in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and 
other crisis-laden hot points. In line with this argument, unipolarity is blamed for the threats to 
international security from the part of the U.S. satellites, above all Georgia (Gromyko 2009: 19­
34). This argument may signify two different things -  both the inability of the United States to 
control the behaviour of its "junior partners” and the U.S. policy of instigating Russia’s 
neighbours to dangerous moves. In both cases the logical link between Tbilisi’s policies in 
South Ossetia and the malign structural effects of unipolarity is not evident. It is equally highly 
questionable that a multipolar structure might be able to rule out outbursts of violence in the 
Caucasus and prevent local elites from using force against their immediate neighbours.
However, it was the critique of unipolarity that justified, in one way or another, Russian 
policymakers’ search for an alternative model of international society, based on the new 
subjectivities which non-Western countries are keen to acquire. As an alternative to the West- 
based systemic unity, Russia expresses much more sympathy to what Alexei Bogaturov 
dubbed "a conglomerate of enclaves”, which cooperate with each other and are disinclined to 
imitate the policies of the West. This vision very much corresponds to the idea of multipolarity 
which gains increasing currency in the Kremlin yet by no means seems to be a uniform policy 
concept. It rather has to be viewed as a contested term, which represents a playground for 
contention between its realist version (mostly embraced by political elites) and more nuanced 
and variegated meanings originated from academic milieu.
At first glance, Russia does indeed look like a predominantly realist type of power, which 
"faces hard yet slightly camouflaged challenge formulated in the categories of political realism” 
where force and national interests predetermine the policies of other countries (Alexeeva 1997: 
59). Russia’s realist approaches are grounded in two conceptual departures -  rationalism and 
pragmatism, which seem to be at the core of the Putin-Medvedev (post) political discourse. The 
Russian version of rationalism might be understood as a type of power maximization through 
mostly economic and financial means, and in this sense it has to be distinguished from the 
imperial model of foreign policy based upon what might be dubbed a "grand design” to be
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implemented at any cost. Pragmatism, in its turn, contains two interrelated presuppositions: the 
high probability and even desirability of unilateral actions in defense of national interests 
skipping the existing institutional structures (which seems to be very close to the concept 
known as “opportunistic behavior” in theories of institutionalism), and the appeal to Russia’s 
partners to build their policies upon the already existing constellation of forces and the political 
relations stemming from it.
In forging relations with other countries, the Russian state gives priority to security and 
geopolitics, and doesn’t hide its sympathies to the Westphalian principles of international 
relations. In a typical realist way of thinking, force is an important argument for Russia 
(according to the Kremlin logics, in August 2008 Mikhail Saakashvili “and those behind him” 
ventured to test the Russian power capabilities). The realist arguments have dominated Putin’s 
famous speech in Munich in February 2007 where he exposed a highly securitized vision of 
Russian foreign policy, grounded in the resistance to the expansion of the NATO military 
infrastructure to the Russian western borders. The longing for a realist type of foreign policy is 
to a large extent predicated on Russia’s description of the United States as a type of actor that 
relies itself upon Realpolitik prescriptions (Soloviov 2003: 50). In particular, NATO was accused
-  also in line with the realist thinking -  of forming a group of small “frontier states” as a 
justification of the alliance’s necessity. It is the United States that skillfully fuels most of low 
intensity conflicts in today’s world, a Russian political analyst deems (Shakleina 2008: 5), while 
another one claims that “pushing Georgia and Ukraine to NATO, the deployment of anti-missile 
system in countries of Eastern-Central Europe, and the plans for transporting the Caspian oil 
skipping Russia are all links of one single chain” (Tsygankov 2008: 44). Russian realism, 
declaring its commitment to focus on “real” facts and “objective” matters, may be seen as a 
bulwark against re-ideologization of international relations on the basis of the Western 
democracy discourse that the Kremlin considers detrimental for Russia. Russian realists thus 
deny the hegemony of liberal -  perhaps, as any other ideological -  values, and ground their 
approaches in “a Hobbesian understanding of the world” politics (Lo 2006: 61-62), with 
multilateral institutions being little more than vehicles by which powerful states establish the 
rules and norms of action. For them, the participation in international institutions does nothing 
to mitigate the anarchical nature of world politics, since states are always interested in pursuing 
either power or survival through self-help (Schneider and Weitsman 1999: 93-110).
Yet the Kremlin’s inclination to a Realpolitik type of thinking could be problematic in 
situations that require a different -  and usually more sophisticated -  set of worldviews and 
policy instruments. This is most evident in Russia’s self-positioning within a multipolar type of 
international society. In the traditions of the Realpolitik thinking, Russia mostly applies two 
kinds of material resources, financial instruments (from credits to gas prices) and force (from 
stationing troops in the neighboring countries to military operation in Georgia in August 2008), 
while investing much less efforts and expertise or sometimes even leaving aside what might be 
called soft power instruments.
2. Multipolarity Unpacked
There is an important methodological note that needs to be addressed at this point. 
One of the research puzzles that the concept of multipolarity brings about lies in its double 
nature, and this ambiguity is quite noticeable in the Russian discourse. On the one hand, it 
would be quite legitimate to view multipolarity as a structural phenomenon in a sense that it is 
destined to come into being and function automatically, as a supposedly natural result of
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either “objective” geopolitical dynamics or not less "objective” internal processes within major 
world powers that diminish the appeal for superpowerness (Radzikhovskiy 2009). Following 
the English School, multipolarity can be considered as a type of international society (Bull 
2002: 31) embodied in certain institutions.
Yet on the other hand, for some Russian IR specialists multipolarity is the name for 
Russia’s long-term strategy, i.e. something which needs to be promoted and therefore 
requires political investments and agents’ policies. Thus, some forms of multilateralism (like 
BRICS, for example) are seen as outcomes of conscious effort of a group of states eager to 
reify the prospects of a multipolar world.
This double-faced nature of the concept of multipolarity partly explains the proliferation 
of its different interpretations. I will start the “unpacking” of this concept on a structural level 
by proposing a menu of at least six patterns of multipolarity presented in the table below. It is 
formed on the basis of two kinds of distinction that appear to be crucial for my analysis, 
namely between a) interest-based and normative structures, and b) between state-centric 
structures and those reaching beyond the state and thus involving a wider gamut of actors. Of 
course, some authors deem that the concept of multipolarity makes sense only within the 
context of relations between nation states, while “in a system where the actorship of non-state 
participants is acknowledged, the notion of multipolarity is devoid of significance” (Agafontsev 
2009: 28), yet it is my thesis that non-state actorship is an important element of multipolar 
arrangements.
It is within the four resulting blocks that different -  yet very much imbricated -  models 
of multipolarity can be located.
Interest-based structures Normative structures
State-centered structures 1A
1B










4: Multiplicity of 
civilizations
Four important comments to this table need to be furnished. First, it is only box 1 -  
with two variations, 1A and 1B -  that neatly corresponds to the realist vision of multipolarity. 
Structurally, both balance of power and great power management are, according to Headley 
Bull’s vocabulary, institutions of international society. As political strategies, both expect to 
raise Russia’s international role without any serious domestic transformations, and both are 
grounded in Russia’s hidden imitation of the major Western powers. As a telling linguistic 
evidence, the metaphor of “chess-board” known for its connotations with Brzezinki’s famous 
book can be found in Russian realist discourse, to be deciphered as the acceptance of the 
“American” rules of the game and an attempt to steer a winning strategy (Semedov 2007: 57). 
The three other table cells are domains of modified (“re-signified”) versions of multipolarity 
that either contain more explicit normative accents (democracy- or civilization-grounded) or 
incorporate actors other than states (polycentrism and multi-regionalism), or both.
Second, four concepts out of six in this table could be simultaneously applicable to 
both structures and agents’ policies -  namely, balance of power, great power management,
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multi-regionalism, and “democratic multipolarity” . This means that the institutional reification of 
each of these mental/conceptual structures directly depends on (and presupposes as the 
condition of their operation) policies of major actors. Consequently, only the two remaining 
concepts may be viewed as structures in Waltzian sense, as “abstractions” “free of the 
attributes and the interactions of units” (Waltz 1983: 80). Indeed, both polycentrism and 
plurality of civilizations are regarded by their adherents as immanent (perhaps inevitable) law­
like characteristics of the socio-political world in its “natural” -  comparable with the physical 
world -  multiplicity, and in this sense do not necessarily require specific actors’ strategies to 
reify each of them. This is, of course, not to say that Russia does not react to the eventuality 
of these structural models, but this reaction rather takes the form of adaptation or 
accommodation than a pro-active strategy.
Third, there are at least three concepts which are part of multipolarity debate but are 
applicable for describing chiefly states’ policies, i.e. are usable on the agent level -  namely, 
unilateralism, multilateralism and multi-vectorness. They do not necessarily correspond to a 
certain type of multipolarity (thus, multilateralism is one of policies inherent in both multi­
regional and polycentric structures of international society) and therefore are not mentioned in 
the table above. Yet I will often resort to these three concepts while addressing the issues of 
Russia’s actorship within the framework of some of the structural models of multipolarity.
Fourth, some of these ideal type models could be quite compatible with each other, 
while others certainly are in conflict. The identification of these models and strategies they 
entail does not necessarily imply the existence of certain groups to promote and stay behind 
each of them. This typology of scenarios is sustained by different articulations of Russia’s role 
identities in a multipolar world, yet neither of them “belongs” to any specific political grouping. 
Neither of scenarios/strategies has its natural “bearers” ; the same group may simultaneously 
adhere to two or more strategies thus demonstrating high volatility of Russia’s role identities.
3. Power Balancing: Back to Realpolitik?
The balance-of-power interpretation of multipolarity, though officially repudiated by 
Russian diplomacy as dangerously obsolete, is still part of Russian foreign policy and security 
thinking. The victorious operation against Georgia in August 2008 and the announcement of 
Russia’s zones of “special interest” strengthened the appeal of balance-of-power approach. 
As a Russian scholar argues, the multipolar system of international relations can be stable 
only under the condition of maintenance of some kind of balance of power between great 
powers (Batiuk 2006) -  a statement that for most of his European colleagues would be 
reminiscent of European diplomacy of 19th century.
As I have mentioned earlier, one has to distinguish between two dimensions of 
balance of power. On the one hand, in accordance with Headley Bull’s logic, as one of 
institutions of international society, it possesses structural characteristics, and thus focuses 
rather on institutional results of a process, than on the attainment of goals being pursued by 
particular state actors. On the other hand, balance of power can be connoted with specific 
policy strategies of major international actors (Sheehan 1996: 142) that invest their resources 
in making this structure functional.
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From structural perspective, the balance-of-power vision reactualizes the practices of 
the Cold War which, as the Russian proponents of this approach argue, was never finished. 
This vision recognizes the reality of the West as a U.S.-led collective political subject whose 
hegemony has to be thwarted, since the United States, according to this logic, are destined to 
continuously reproduce the relations of enmity with the non-Western world. There were those 
in Russian elites who in the immediate aftermath of the downfall of the Soviet Union 
anticipated that the post-Cold War order would evolve to a milder (i.e. less conflictual) version 
of bipolarity (Bazhanov and Bazhanova 2008: 24), yet as soon as idealism and naivety of 
these expectations became obvious, the formation of a more equitable, i.e. to be based on 
several power holders to contain and balance each other, world system turned into the key 
priority for the Kremlin diplomacy. Yet this blueprint could be operational only under two chief 
conditions: power has to be conceptualized as a) an instrument that states practically apply 
for the sake of their interests, and b) as a rather homogeneous resource which presumably 
can be more or less equally distributed among a group of key holders (Gadzhiev 1998: 359) 
for the sake of global stability. These presumptions however can be challenged from at least 
three related perspectives.
One counter-argument is that power is not a resource which has a common 
denominator, and thus can’t be divided or transferred from one unit to another; it always 
comes in a variety of forms. “What counts as power depends on definitions of the situation” 
(Wendt 1999: 331), one may say. Thus, the plurality of power holders may not be a result of 
the concerted distribution of power among a certain number of states but rather a 
consequence of the immanent plurality of power resources as such. Consequently, centers of 
power are principally dispersed: economic, financial, political, military, cultural centers may 
co-exist with each other without merging, each one having its own operational and functional 
spheres. This is what partly was captured by former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov’s reference 
to “real multipolarity” as a co-existence of plurality of international systems each one 
grounded in a particular type of resources and influences, both material and ideational 
(Ivanov 2004-2005: 11)
Therefore, power is by no means a homogeneous resource, and there are many types 
of it. For instance, poles of economic growth might not coincide with poles of military power, 
etc. Thus, North Korea, being deprived of either economic or political might, does possess 
certain military capabilities; Vatican, having no military resources, is a source of strong 
spiritual and religious appeal for the world Catholic community; Switzerland, without any 
military resources, is definitely one of key centers of financial power in the world. The Nordic 
countries, lacking meaningful military resources, do compensate their absence with a 
powerful normative appeal.
Against this background, the question of what kind of power is Russia seems to be of 
particular interest. Even patriotically-minded authors recognize that Russia is short of 
economic and military components of power, and what rests is its political (membership in 
Security Council), geopolitical (huge territory) and energy resources (Konopatov 2007: 13­
20). In the normative battlefield, however, Russia’s credentials are much poorer, which 
explains a lot in the nature of communicative disconnections between the Kremlin and its 
Western partners. Even the most pragmatic type of relationship -  as between Moscow and 
Berlin -  may be complicated, if not challenged, by the interventions of normative matters, as
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nicely epitomized by the revoke of the Quadriga Prize award to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
in summer 2011.
Another argument would be more of Foucauldian nature, arguing that power is 
something that produces agents but does not belong to them. Power is not agents’ 
possession but rather a web of relations that forms/makes/constructs social subjects. It can 
mean that different patterns of multipolarity are grounded in the re-activation and 
instrumentalization of various identity resources which might give different effects. In other 
words, a Russia of balance-of-power thinking and a Russia committed to the polycentric 
worldview are two different international identities, with different types of international 
subjectivity inherent in each of them.
Finally, one more counter-argument points to the nature of the poles and their 
configuration which is by no means static but rather flexible (Torkunov 2006: 26) and may 
include cultural, ethnic and religious identities as well. In this light, balance of power can be 
viewed not as “a fixed reality, but an approach subject to the effects of the evolution of 
political thought and, indeed, of broader cultural developments” (Sheehan 1996: 142).
From a policy strategy perspective, balance of power is presumed upon the ability of 
sovereign powers to take political decisions of their own, a perspective rather close to the 
Schmittian concept of pluriverse (Filippov 2004: 90). Thus, the implementation of balance of 
power as policy strategy is directly conditioned upon the maintenance of sovereignty -  a key 
concept for Russian self-determination in the world. Consequently, the reverse side of power 
balancing is unilateralism, grounded in the logic of sovereign decisions which Russia favors 
itself and expects from other most powerful countries as well. President Medvedev’s multiple 
suggestions that the Western governments need to be pragmatic and guided by their own 
“genuine interests” (Medvedev 2008b) fit, by and large, into the decisionist philosophy. As a 
“United Russia” party functionary presumed, within the multipolar society “each country is 
supposed to represent its own interests, instead of delegating them to EU, NATO and other 
international organizations” (Rossiiskiy konservatizm... 2009: 36). This seemingly anti- 
institutional and anti-normative utterance is a blunt declaration of mistrust to those forms of 
international cooperation that entail a dispersal of sovereignty understood by Moscow as a 
right to control territories rather than as responsibility to population.
Yet, as I have noted earlier, the idea of balancing presupposes a certain degree of 
conflictuality between different poles (Strategia-2020 2008: 23), which made Dmitri Trenin call 
the balance-of-power policy “a continuation of the Cold War inertia, which strengthens the 
arguments of those who would like to see Russia returning to the Soviet policy pathways” 
(Trenin 2001: 54). Besides, the implementation of this model would ultimately result in 
Russia’s submission to China as its junior partner and thus harm Russia’s international 
subjectivity. It is indicative that in the Russian official discourse China has never featured 
among the powers that Russia might wish to balance, which reveals a predominantly anti­
Western profile of the balance-of-power concept.
It is from here that another serious trouble for this concept emerges. On the one hand, 
the balancing strategy indeed presupposes Russia’s association with anti-Western identities 
shaped by post-colonial type of discourse that emanates from peripheral or semi-peripheral 
actors. On the other hand, in addressing the most pressing security issues Russia tends to 
appeal to -  and prefers to deal with -  the leaders of the West. These two dispositions may
CGP Working Papers 1/2011 12
Andrey Makarychev Multipolarity in Plural
not easily sit together, since a Russia sympathetic with anti-Western sentiments will most 
likely be perceived by United States and EU as their external Other rather than recognized as 
part of Europe.
One may agree that the balance-of-power type of multipolarity “is a direct and 
unequivocal alternative to globalization” (Fiodorov 1999: 19) since it may foster a more 
regionalized political and security scenery by forging “regional sub-balances” (in the 
Mediterranean basin, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea regions, and so forth). The linkage 
between balance of power and multi-regionalism is not, of course, straightforward, yet it may 
have some parallels with Buzan and Waever’s theory of “regional security complexes” whose 
existence is preconditioned by the locally-based durable patterns of securitization. The 
prospects of regionalization of the balance of power type of relationship raise at least two 
critical points. Structurally, the fragmentation of the international society into regional power 
balancing systems contrasts quite sharply with a hypothetically unified Euro-Atlantic “security 
space”, as imagined in Medvedev’s proposals on “new security architecture”. As seen from 
the agency perspective, balancing approaches give at least two negative effects. On the one 
hand, the policy of keeping regional sub-balances of power may immobilize Russian 
diplomacy which is perceived as being aimed not at finding political solutions to regional 
conflicts but at preserving uncertain status quo. This is very much so in the Caucasus where 
Russian tactics of balancing between Armenia and Azerbaijan (and, in a wider sense, 
between the broader coalitions of forces behind each of the two parties) gives no practical 
results for resolving the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. On the other hand, as soon as Russia 
more explicitly positions itself as a hegemon surrounded by satellite states, most of its post­
Soviet neighbours “opt for the most natural kind of behaviour under the circumstances: they 
all have become the classical balancers” (Torbakov 2011: 11).
4. The Great Powers Management: an Oligarchic Type of Multipolarity?
Great power management (GPM), along with balance of power, was considered by 
Headley Bull as an institution based on strongest actors. It is in this sense that it can be 
considered an oligarchic type of international society. Yet GPM may have different resonance 
in Russian discourse. One is of geopolitical background: it affirms the utility of various “axes” 
and “triangles” (or other geometric figures) that ought to link Russia to the strongest 
international actors. In its most radical version -  adduced by Alexander Dugin -  the Russian 
government is urged to make restitution of Kaliningrad and the Kuril Islands in exchange for 
privileged relations with, respectively, Germany and Japan.
Another -  and much more widely spread -  approach to GPM denotes a pragmatically 
de-politicized type of bargaining between the world poles. Against this backdrop, historical 
models of GPM (like, for instance, the Vienna Congress system) are depicted as a counter­
variant to the Bismarck-style Realpolitik (Mayorov 2010: 7-8). Nowadays, perhaps, the NATO- 
Russia relationship could exemplify this model of multipolarity. Arguably, the Georgia war, 
despite the seemingly deep cleavages between Russia and major Western governments it 
provoked, fostered some elements of GPM. The Russia -  NATO relations which reached
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their peak of securitization in August 2008, have gradually evolved into a more business-as- 
usual type of bargaining with concessions from both sides. Under the Obama administration 
the US reconsidered the deployment of anti-missile systems in Poland and Czech Republic 
and decreased its involvement in countries that Russia includes in the sphere of its interest, 
NATO has frozen the accession process of Georgia and Ukraine; while Russia increased its 
involvement in the operation in Afghanistan and pledged to cooperate against Somalia 
pirates, which corroborates Alexander Astrov’s prediction that GPM tends to evolve into a 
police-type administering of conflicts (Astrov 2011: 1-24). Some of Russian authors are 
equally sympathetic to the prospects of "dividing and conjugating” Russian and U.S. policies 
in CIS area, with special emphasis on joint conflict management and anti-narcotic measures 
(Riurikov 2010: 29-34).
Another prototype of GPM is the partnership between EU and Russia. As a result of 
the Medvedev -  Sarkozy talks of August 2008, Russia has officially recognized EU as a 
legitimate security actor in its "near abroad” area. As INSOR (Moscow-based Institute for 
Contemporary Development) argued, the growth of EU influence worldwide seems to be quite 
in line with the idea of multipolarity, which constitutes a fertile soil for Russia’s strategic 
partnership with EU in such spheres as the formation of common energy space, and joint 
markets for transportation and technology transfer (Yurgens 2008: 26).
In its most radical version GPM may be close to what a Russian scholar called "a 
policy of responsible colonialism”, meaning by this metaphor a de-facto control from the part 
of EU, US and Russia over those regions which represent security challenges for them 
(including terrorism, migration, human trafficking, etc.) (Remizov 2011). Yet GPM does not 
seem to be a workable institution without purely political agreements between the key 
"stakeholders”. Political momentum is necessarily a condition for more or less successful 
instances of cooperation between great powers, either in the form of external securitization of 
threats (piracy, drug trafficking, etc.), or as a political deal (Russia’s support of the US in its 
war on terror after September 11 was implicitly conditioned by American support of Russian 
policies in North Caucasus) (Khalidov 2007: 6-15). The political dimension of the EU-Russian 
partnership consists in preventing Russia from pursuing a strategy of balancing the West 
through aligning with non-Western governments, including China (Vaquer i Fanes 2010: 20). 
When political momentum is weak and the major actors pretend operating from purely 
technical positions, the conflict is doomed to prevail over cooperative approaches. The 
ineffectiveness of the Minsk group is perhaps an illustration of great powers’ inability to jointly 
manage a particular conflict in the absence of political wills.
For the Kremlin the political significance of the GPM model is manifested in the 
prospect of Russia’s acceptance as an equal power by the constitutive members of 
international society. In the Russian eyes, GPM could serve as a proof for Russia’s raising 
importance for the Western countries with whom Moscow is ready to negotiate the conditions 
of cooperation. Thus, Russia is not against EU or NATO enlargement in principle -  it only 
dislikes the expansion of these institutions in the immediate proximity to Russia’s borders, 
which makes clear that Russian interests are ostensibly regional, not global. As far as in 
1994, after the inception of the Bosnian crisis, one of Russian experts nicely expressed 
Russia’s attitude to the West presuming that Moscow could have supported the Western 
intervention in the Balkans under two conditions -  a) NATO should stop using military force
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without prior consultations with Moscow, and b) Russia has to be eventually admitted to 
NATO. What is hidden between the lines in this utterance is that Moscow is not against 
applying military force in principle -  it wishes to either be consulted with, or even participate in 
interventions on behalf on international society (Parkhalina 1994). It is very much telling in 
this regard that in 2011 Russian diplomats did not rule out the co-participation of Russian 
troops in a hypothetical land operation in Libya, should the UN Security Council authorizes 
such a possibility.
Reaching political agreement between great powers may be thinkable on bilateral 
level, but much more serious problems arise as soon as it comes to multilateral formats that, 
ideally, have to -  in contrast to the historical connotations of this term -  engage non-Western 
states as well. Another troublesome aspect of the GPM implementation is the reaction from 
non-great-powers. The orientation of the Russian diplomacy to dealing predominantly with 
major powers may have its repercussions for Moscow’s relations with post-Soviet countries 
that will inevitably feel either ignored or doomed to play the unfortunate roles of Russia’s 
“junior partners”.
Perhaps, an alternative to GPM could be a sort of “regional powers management” 
concept. In many respects, Turkey and Iran -  which are not parts of either BRICS or SCO -  
are more important for Russia than Brazil or even India. It is with countries like Turkey and 
Iran that Russia has to find a common language in its regional policies in the Caucasus, Black 
Sea and Caspian Sea regions.
Comparing the Two Models
What unites the balance-of-power and great-power-management models of 
multipolarity is not only their embeddedness in a realist theorizing, but also their potential 
openness to accepting imperial subjectivities. There is indeed a problem of great power 
identities evolving in -  or gravitating to -  imperial ones. Arguably, the concept of empire can 
be applied for characterization of some aspects of today’s Russia foreign policy (Obran 
2008), and in the West many believe that Russia is only hiding its allegedly irremovable 
imperial nature and concomitant ambitions in pseudo-normative rhetoric.
Russia’s self-representations through the concept of empire are closely connected to 
European and American discourses on their presumably imperial identities (Aalto 2004). As 
Viacheslav Morozov argues, the EU’s subjectivity encompasses a strong “imperial moment”, 
which coincided with the appearance of more accentuated transformation in the direction of 
“sovereign territorial state” model (Morozov 2008). Valery Tishkov adds to this that major 
European countries “for quite a long time retained their imperial qualities but in the meantime 
were gradually becoming egalitarian nation states” (Tishkov 2007: 25).
The imperial inclinations of the US and EU may be perceived as challenges to Russia, 
but nevertheless the Russian role identities are constructed through some kind of reference to 
the empire-building practices of Russia’s alleged competitors. In many cases, Russia 
ventured to imitate the U.S. international behaviour. As Russian authors put it, the Kremlin 
“read the American verbal message as a certain semiotic code and then adapted it to its own 
needs” (Zevelev and Troitskiy 2006: 33). The Moscow political elite, as frankly admitted by a 
Russian analyst, all throughout 1990s had “looked at the United States with a mixed feeling of 
indignation and admiration. Even illegitimate actions in defense of the U.S. own interests
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were perceived (in Moscow. -  A.M.) as examples to be followed and reproduced by Russia 
itself: if Washington does so, why Russia can’t?” (Oznobischev 2008: 125). One may agree 
that most of the time Russia was -  though tacitly -  fascinated with the United States as a 
successful country relying upon force without much of reflections about following the norms 
and avoiding repercussions. Arguably, Russia’s inclination to imitate the American imperial 
conduct reveals Russia’s own proclivity to imperial greatpowerness (Kara-Murza 1996: 32). In 
particular, Anatoly Chubais’ articulation of the liberal empire thesis appears to echo “the Bush 
administration’s grand strategy that may be imperial, but it aims at creating liberal, rather than 
autocratic or totalitarian, governance” (Rhodes 2003: 137). This is exactly how Russia is 
perceived by some of its neighbours -  as a less successful copy of the United States (Kizima 
2009: 58).
This is also true with regard to Europe. One of conservative voices in Russia 
presumes that the formation of the EU subjectivity in an imperial form is a feasible 
perspective for the future, since the EU potentially has its own ambitions, interests, and 
ideology that will push it to take certain actions of its own (Kholmogorov 2002). This trajectory 
could be beneficial for Russia since it might be instrumental in balancing the U.S. geopolitical 
preponderance. As a Russian author reports, “should a new, Anglo-Saxon empire take its 
shape, Russia, instead of resisting, should have busy itself with recreating its own empire” 
(Lurie 2003-2004: 107). This “oligarchic” type of multipolar international society seems to be 
in some dissonance with the idea of “democratic multipolarity” to be discussed in the next 
section.
5. “Democratic Multipolarity” and Russia’s Normative Offensive
The next perspective of multipolarity imbues some normative flavor to it by linking it 
with democracy. Normative aspects of multipolarity -  in particular, in its balance-of-power 
version -  were noticeable even in realist literature in at least two aspects. First, the resort to 
domestic analogy can draw parallels between the principle of checks and balances as a key 
institutional tool for democratic government, on the one hand, and the balancing between 
competing states that has deterring effects. Second, for many realists, the goals of 
democracy, along with justice and equality, can be “stabilized only by balance of power 
among states” (Cerny 2010: 64).
Yet Russia’s “normative offensive” with the issue of “international democracy” at its 
core is certainly an explicitly ideological move, since it requires the tacit acknowledgement of 
undemocratic nature of the West, and its dethroning from the global normative pedestal. In 
his “Munich speech” ex-President Putin lambasted the American concept of unipolar world as 
presumed upon “one single center of power”, a situation that, arguably, “has nothing to do 
with democracy”. Sergei Lavrov went as far as to promote Russia as “a territory of freedom” in 
international society due to its resolution to openly raise a set of issues that earlier were either 
ignored or silenced. All this made a group of Russian authors believe that Russia and United 
States are in a state of normative contest over the concept of democracy (Lebedev and 
Kireev 2008: 67-72) -  a situation that politically reactualizes the legacy of the Cold War
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ideological competition, yet academically can be however expressed in a more neutral 
categories of a conflict between pluralist and solidarist versions of international society.
Experimentally exploring the democratic potential of international pluralism as 
embodied in the concept of multipolarity, Russian leaders have to project the language 
traditionally suited for domestic purposes into the domain of international politics. In doing so 
they imply that it is multipolarity that fosters the development of democratic institutions in 
international arena; in other words, all types of multipolarity are believed to be equivalent to 
international democracy. In this reading democracy appears to be void of political meanings 
and reduced to the mere multiplicity of sovereign states, regardless of the internal nature of 
their political regimes. Not incidentally, Russia recourses to the "democratic multipolarity” 
rhetoric basically in communication with countries like China, Belarus, Iran, Venezuela, India, 
Cuba and others, most of them lacking convincing record of domestic democratic rule. 
"Democratic multipolarity”, understood as a simple redistribution of the alleged "world power” 
among several poles of force, makes the issues of liberty, free competition and other core 
elements of democracy either irrelevant or equally acceptable along with authoritarianism, 
totalitarianism, non-market economy, etc. (Fiodorov 1999: 21)
.Yet the explanation of international democracy through the concept of multipolarity 
can be questioned by Russia’s employment of democratic rhetoric in quite a different context. 
Thus, according to the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept of Russia, Russia’s policy goal in Europe 
is not any type of order but a "genuinely open and democratic system of collective security” 
(Russian Foreign Ministry 2008). This statement means that not only pluralism, but solidarism 
as well can, in the Russian eyes, be democratic, provided that it serves Russian interests of 
being accepted as a power equal to its Western partners. Therefore, Russia tends to utilize 
the normative conception of international democracy in ostensibly pragmatic way, as an 
operational tool to increase its normative power.
6. Poly-centrism: Learning to Live in a Post-International World
For many Russian foreign policy speakers poly-centrism is synonymous to 
multipolarity. This simplistic interchangeability of the two terms seems to miss however a 
meaningful point: the idea of poly-centrism is grounded in a particular domain of theory 
located at the intersection of trans-nationalism and a bunch of post-sovereignty/post-national 
conceptualizations. In a poly-centric world the state is not in a position to preserve its 
modern/”Westphalian” characteristics; it has to undergo deep domestic transformations in 
reaction to the growing -  perhaps enforced -  competition with other actors, sometimes more 
resourceful and normatively appealing than the states.
A polycentric world embraces such new "configuration of subjectivities” (Kapitsyn 
2009: 74-75) as the prevalence of mobile/ad-hoc coalitions based upon soft power resources, 
growing asymmetry and turbulence, the multiplicity of political and institutional playgrounds 
for international subjects, and "open” -  i.e. inclusive and non-discriminatory -  model of 
regionalism (Gadzhiev 1998: 343) grounded in networks of "centers of growth” and leaving 
much space for participation of non-state actors (Konovalov 2008). By defying state-centric 
worldviews, poly-centrism undermines the validity of the "us against them” type of thinking by
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questioning and dissolving the essentialized conception of a taken-for-granted “collective We” 
as opposed to -  or encircled by -  inimical identities.
Poly-centrism may be in tune with Michel Foucault’s (and Gilles Deleuze’s) theorizing 
of power as a combination of different spaces which may overlap yet preserve their relative 
autonomy. Thus, projecting Foucauldian reasoning to the sphere of international society, one 
may arguably single out domains of political power with its key holders possessing of vast 
military resources and securitization abilities; managerial power which manifests itself 
through the instruments of governmentality, including technical (de-politicized) administration 
and policing; disciplinary power that acts in the forms of regulatory mechanisms of constantly
-  though slowly -  evolving norms; and bio-power which trans-nationally takes the forms of 
“responsibility to protect” and “humanitarian interventions”. The fragmentation of power 
relations into spaces/segments, which is at the core of the Foucauldian approach, seems to 
be quite consonant with the poly-centric worldview, since each of the forms of power 
presupposes its own key subjects that are in principle unable to balance -  in a traditional 
sense -  each other due to different mechanisms, institutions and resources they are based 
on.
For most Russian experts poly-centrism has positive connotations, but in different 
ways. For some of them, the philosophy of poly-centrism ought to be grounded in the 
recognition of equal value of each non-state identity. This type of multipolarity is viewed as a 
compensation for inevitable degradation of nation states and the subsequent global 
imposition of a new version of “general will” embodied in the U.S.-led neoliberal model of 
global governance (Ponomariova 2007: 95-110). On a policy level, poly-centrism is one of 
structural preconditions of the so called “networked diplomacy”, a concept used by the 
Russian Foreign Ministry basically to denote a more inclusive type of relations between 
traditional nation states (like Russia), security unions (such as NATO), supranational 
institutions (for instance, EU), and international organizations (OSCE, SCTO, etc.) for the 
sake of crisis prevention and conflict management. There are no evidences whatsoever that 
the Kremlin is likely to consider other global actors -  such as international NGOs or trans­
national corporations -  as possible contributors to the “networking diplomacy”.
Yet skeptical voices also abound, pointing to non-universal character of a new post­
sovereignty/post-national world: it is argued that U.S. is by no means going to dissolve or 
relegate its sovereignty to either supra-, trans-, or sub-national units (Proskurin 2003). 
Therefore, a post-national/cosmopolitan worldview may be seen as leading to Russia’s further 
degradation and unfortunate loss of its subjectivity.
7. Multi-regionalism: a World without Hegemons?
The idea of multi-regionalism rests upon the plurality of “regional orders”, or “systems 
of international order built around regional spheres of responsibility”. Close to this approach is 
the English school-promoted idea of “regional states-systems or regional international 
societies”, or “many worlds of different regionalism” (Hurrell 2007: 128). In Russia, too, there 
are voices supporting the view of “new regionalism” as a form of multipolarity (Tzarikaev 
2010).
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Multi-regionalism, as understood by Buzan and Waever, may be best realizable in the 
absence of superpowers which seems to correspond to Russia’s vision of the international 
society. It is symptomatic that multipolarity discourse in Russia includes explicit references to 
the idea of “regionalization of global politics” (Lavrov 2009). Regionalization has two 
meanings within this context. On the one hand, it denotes “a search for regional solutions for 
conflicts and crises”, which, more specifically, means the avoidance of possible interventions 
from the part of external powers, among which NATO in general and US in particular seem to 
be most menacing for the Kremlin. On the other hand, regionalization, in Sergei Lavrov’s 
eyes, could serve as an insurance mechanism to prevent the possible fragmentation of 
international society as a result of what might be dubbed “de-globalization”, or a reversal of 
the global moment. It is through the prism of these two arguments that the conceptual linkage 
between multipolarity and multiregionality might be elucidated.
As far as the “search for regional solutions” is concerned, the Russian stance here 
appears to be consonant with the idea of Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) introduced by 
Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. At the center of their theory is a variety of “security regions” as 
international subsystems where most of security interactions are internal. “Superpowers by 
definition largely transcend the logic of geography and adjacency in their security 
relationships” (Buzan and Waever 2006: 46), they claim. Against this background, RSCs are 
conceptualized as barriers that prevent superpowers from intervening in security situations on 
regional level; they are defined as groups of units (countries and/or, perhaps, their parts) 
whose processes of securitization and de-securitization are so interlinked that their security 
practices cannot be analyzed or resolved apart from one another (Buzan and Waever 2006: 
44), and do not necessitate projection of external force(s). Therefore, the differences between 
the inside and the outside appear to play the key role in the conceptualization of this type of 
regionalism which, in particular, explains why Russia is quite sympathetic with the prospects 
of the Caspian regionalism which, in the Kremlin’s eyes, ought to be decided among the five 
“local” states uninterested in allowing foreign influence.
The second argument introduced by Lavrov also might be approached from the 
theoretical viewpoint grounded in the traditions of the English school which treats 
regionalization as an “approach to world order” presupposing a reorganization of world 
politics along regional lines. For Hedley Bull, regionalism is a middle ground between states 
and global organizations. On the one hand, regional organizations are able to fulfill at least 
some of the functions envisaged for global bodies; on the other hand, they can avoid some of 
the accusations addressed to global organizations (domination, power projection, etc.). Bull 
argues that regional organizations may contribute to a more peaceful world order because 
they defy the concentration of power in the hands of superpowers, encourage small states to 
strengthen their potential through pooling resources; contribute to lower the dangers of 
sovereignty-based system by creating institutions beyond the states; reduce the incentives for 
wars through webs of interdependence, and tend to insulate regions from global conflicts.
The concept of multiregionalism in both readings -  as a possibility for local crisis 
management and an insurance against a Hobbesian world -  seems to be quite ambiguous. 
Being one of the possible versions / interpretations of multipolarity, it by the same token 
questions Russia’s exclusive sphere of influence in its near abroad. Instead of substantiating 
a Kremlin-protected “area of vital interest” that serves as one of the proves for Russia’s claims
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for the status of a major international pole, the multiregionality perspective decomposes the 
post-Soviet space into several regions that are far from being under Russia’s supervision. 
These regions are rather effects of the EU enlargement and its neighborhood policy. Hence, it 
is through the prism of multiregionalism that the concept of an allegedly unified post-Soviet 
space can be deconstructed, and the policy gap between Russia and Europe identified. 
Indeed, the "mental maps” of Europe’s margins are seen quite differently from Moscow and 
Brussels. EU deliberately invests its resources and efforts in region-building for both 
pluralizing Europe’s regional scene and making it more adaptable and sensitive to 
Europeanization. Russia finds itself under a strong influence of this type of policy and wishes 
to take some practical advantage of the EU-sponsored regional projects, yet in the meantime 
sometimes resorts to discursive othering of -  and therefore distancing from -  regional 
groupings which the Kremlin perceives as alien to Russia, i.e. orchestrated by other great 
powers. Russia sees no much avail for itself in adapting to the experiences of EU-sponsored 
regionalist initiatives in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, as well as the Mediterranean.
This raises an important question of whether the idea of region-making as a protection 
against "extra-regional forces” can be universally applicable and productive. Even in those 
cases -  like the Caspian region-building project -  where this approach comes into 
prominence, there are multiple external non-state actors like major oil and gas companies 
playing their major roles. The RSC-based vision of multiregionalism seems to be consonant 
with what might be dubbed "closed regionalism”, which is "aimed at defending region from the 
negative effects of globalization” (Deliagin 2001) and spells an "autarkic policy of reliance 
upon local forces” (Mikheev 1999: 56), a strategy that is directly challenged by the philosophy 
of Medvedev’s proposals on a uniform security arrangements in all Euro-Atlantic region.
In the meantime, debates about new regions-in-the-making, including those with 
Russia’s participation, should not miss one important point: some of them may contribute to 
mitigating global security concerns. For example, Iran’s involvement in the Caspian region­
building project may become one of elements of deeper international socialization of this 
country, with all positive effects of taking institutional and normative commitments.
8. Poles as Civilizations
There are different modalities in which the idea of plurality of civilizations is actualized 
in Russia’s political and academic discourses. The most typical political articulation can be 
found in Dmitry Medvedev’s reference to EU, US and Russia as three branches of the 
European civilization destined to closely cooperate with each other (Medvedev 2008c). 
Therefore, from the structural perspective, both unity of this wider European civilization and 
compatibility of its different territorial parts (perhaps, as remote as Russia’s Far East) are 
taken almost for granted. As for Russia’s strategy, it consists in this interpretation neither in 
developing policies for joining European institutions nor in taking commitments in view of the 
Europeanization prospects, but rather in making the West to accept Russia’s historical 
belongingness to the presumably common European civilization (Mezhuev 2009).
Yet academic discourses offer much more variegated panoply of civilization-based 
articulations of multipolarity which seem to be in disharmony with the political discourse in two
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most significant regards -  not all of them depart from state-centric platform, and not all are 
that West-friendly.
Let us start with those "pictures” of multipolarity that articulate certain mistrust to the 
state. Thus, for Alexander Neklessa, Russian civilizational identity is not state-bound but 
rather polyphonic, cross-border and even trans-continental (Neklessa 2008). Plurality of 
civilizations as a particular case of normative plurality does not any longer make references to 
states indispensable. The concept of Russia as a "sovereign civilization” (Naumov and Slonov 
2007: 21-30) not only makes civilizational discourse compatible with the idea of multipolarity, 
but also is presumed on the declining role of the nation states (Sokolov 2006: 141-154). 
Civilizational resource is believed to be relatively independent of political elites and is viewed 
as a compensation for Russia’s weakness as a nation. In a wider sense, this reasoning 
sounds quite in tune with the anticipation of gradual transformations in political subjectivity -  
from nation states to a type of new multi-nodal composite actors based upon durable 
communications between culturally, religiously and linguistically related communities 
(Andreev 2011: 98). There are versions of civilizational approach which are not inimical to the 
prospects of world government as a pathway of merging separate civilizations into one of the 
global scale. Inter-civilizational communications may take the practical forms of trade 
promotion, tourist exchanges, inter-urban cultural flows, the activities of NGOs etc (Afanasiev 
2008).
By the same token, as I mentioned earlier, not all academic interpretations of 
civilization-based approach are in agreement with Russia’s role identity as an inalienable part 
of integral all-European civilization (Isaev 2006). Many Russian scholars argue that 
multipolarity can be successful only being based upon civilizational background (Martynov 
2009: 64) and deem that Russia is in possession of its own distinctive cultural profile in the 
world, quite distinct from the West. According to their logic, each of the centers of power in 
the world can be viewed as a peculiar civilization, including United States, China, Russia, and 
India. Thus, the belongingness to civilization becomes one of the key criteria of sovereignty 
and a justification for Russia’s expansion of its spheres of interest. A distinctive from Europe 
civilizational status is regarded as a possibility for Russia to achieve equality with Europe, 
while the idea of Russia’s belongingness to the common European civilization is believed to 
be equivalential to the voluntary acceptance of Russia’s backwardness vis-à-vis its more 
developed western neighbors. In the meantime, what is metaphorically dubbed "civilizational 
immunity” "prevents from implanting to Russia alien to national organism models of 
democracy” (Leonova 2010).
The key problem with this approach is that it appears to be a deliberately wide 
container of the most parochial and extremely mythologized perceptions of Russian historical 
self (or a mystical "Russian idea”) (Baburin 2011), including "self-sacrifice” for the sake of 
"saving the world”, "worldwide responsiveness”, the preponderance of chimerical "justice” 
over "legal rule”, "the search for truth and happiness for all mankind”, and other nativist and 
indigenous self-representations of "Russianness”. Within the multipolarity discourse this may 
translate into a moribund and somehow ironic idea of Russia as a sovereign "pole of global 
justice”, which contains explicit anti-European connotations (Naumov and Slonov 2008: 65­
88). It is mostly within the civilization-approach that the old-style dichotomy between the West 
and Russia is reproduced as based upon highly dysfunctional distinctions between (Western)
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“individualism” versus (Russian) “solidarist responsibility” , “society as market” versus “society 
as family”, moral relativism versus the pursuance of justice, etc. In this respect, identity swaps 
in the form of Europeanization are considered as dubious and mostly ineffective (Belchuk 
2008: 29-42), and the variety of social problems in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (corruption, 
lack of rule of law, etc.) may be “normalized”, i.e. explained as belonging to the domain of 
their civilizational identity. Civilizational approach thus becomes the pivotal point in Russia’s 
ideology of autonomous self-sufficiency as exemplified, inter alia, by the sovereign 
democracy concept (Novikov 2007: 23), which fits in the multipolarity discourse.
One of the key proponents of civilization-based approaches in Russia, Vladimir 
Yakunin (the head of the state-controlled “Russian railways” corporation), deduces his appeal 
to nurture the multiplicity of civilizations from the alleged dangers to the US-led cultural 
unification which, in his reasoning, may have some historical parallels with the Nazi Germany. 
By making this dubious comparison, Yakunin clearly unveils the ostensibly anti-Western bias 
of his reading of civilizational approach which, in his imaginary, is the only alternative to the 
violent domination of “one sole superpower” (Yakunin 2010: 94-95).
As for practical implications of the civilization-based approach, several of them can be 
mentioned. First, Leonid Ivashov, for example, deems that it is BRICS that became the first 
political and institutional reification of the century-old ideas of the ability of civilizations to play 
their roles as worldwide political subjects. BRICS states represent, in his view, the model type 
of different civilizations that are in dialogue with each other (Ivashov 2011). He proposed the 
reorganization of the UN Security Council on the civilizational grounds, provided that Europe 
and United States form two different civilizational units.
Second, “Edinaya Rossiya” party gives a different rationale for civilizational approach, 
arguing that it is only on the basis of common civilizational platform that Russia might incite 
Belarus and Ukraine to integrate in either “Pax Slavica” or “Pax Orthodoxa” (Baburin 2006). In 
accordance with this logic, these two Slavic neighbors ought to be included into “Russian 
civilization” which in this context looks like a cultural version of “spheres of influence” which 
does not stipulate the acceptance of sovereign status of both neighboring republics (including 
their own language policies, domestic institutions, freedom of foreign orientations, etc.) 
(Laktionova 2010). Conceptually, this argument has two drawbacks. What is most important, 
it contravenes the concept of post-Soviet integration as an inclusive project transcending 
ethnic or national boundaries of participating states. In fact, the idea of “Slavic unity” sends an 
unfriendly message to the Central Asian and Caucasian countries which are critically 
important to Russia in many respects. Yet this concept contains another logical trap: being 
favorable to the unity of Slavic peoples, it is extremely suspicious to the equivalent idea of a 
union of Turkic people which is depicted as a trick to boost international profile of Turkey to 
the detriment of Russia (Isaev 2002).
In a more practical sense, the references to Ukraine and Belarus for proponents of 
“Slavic unity” are politically self-defeating since neither Kiev nor Minsk seems to reify the 
dreams about a Moscow-led integration. It is quite indicative that the post-orange revolution 
Ukraine under Viktor Yuschenko’s presidency is gradually drifting to a more pro-European 
policy and is keen to keep challenging Russian interests in energy transportation business. 
The addition of Serbia to the potential members of “Pax Slavica” makes this imaginary 
community more dubious since Belgrade is consistently moving to the EU and demonstrates
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more divergence than conformity to the Russian trajectory in Europe. The cases of Poland 
and Bulgaria illustrate this trend even better. By the same token, the idea of "Orthodox unity” 
is politically discredited by Russia’s war with Georgia, as well as tensions with Romania and 
Moldova in the Transdniestrian conflict.
Third, some of the Russian discourse-makers claim that Russia possesses an almost 
unique capability of bridging gaps between civilizations ("partnership of civilizations”). This 
hypothetical brokerage appears to be a wishful thinking and is aimed basically for domestic 
consumption, since it fails to explain why the West and the East can’t get along without 
Russian mediation.
Fourth, another practical project that stems from the civilization-approach is the 
"Russian world” policy which is grounded in the idea of reincorporating Russian-speaking 
communities abroad into the sphere of Russian language and culture. It reaches much 
beyond the idea of "pan-Slavism” which, as most Russian authors admit, is (geo)politically 
dead (Zadokhin 2004). But the idea of the "Russian world” is not only about diasporal and 
language-based linkages; it is filled/saturated with a more normative content to include a 
variety of signifiers referring to Russia’s imperial traditions, its great power status, and such 
political characteristics of Russian identity as a quasi-sacred respect to power, paternalism, 
toleration, messianic feelings to others, etc. (Gromyko 2010). Yet the "Russian world” concept 
lacks uniformity: the Russian Orthodox Church advocates its religious foundations, while the 
Kremlin views it as a Russian version of soft power.
Fifth, the civilization-approach can be instrumental in coining the "European non-West’ 
concept, with Russia and Turkey playing the key roles in its political implementation. Yet 
within Russian academic community there are strong voices of those scholars who think that 
Turkey -  in its capacity as a "regional hegemon” and an "order setter” (Bechev 2011: 9) -  is 
more a competitor of Russia than its potential ally (Ordynskiy 2011).
Apart from these contradictions, it has to be noted that the civilization-based narrative 
may be politically used for substantiating arguments that are in conflict with the Russian 
worldview. For instance, it may become a discursive tool justifying skeptical attitudes to the 
"post-Soviet” integration from the part of non-Slavic countries of which Georgia is a good 
example. In particular, the Baltic States refer to Huntington’s concept of "clash of civilizations” 
as a theoretical justification for alienation from Russia (an anti-Russian discursive tool).
Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that the concept of multipolarity, being originally part of 
neorealist academic discourse, became one of key political shapers of Russia’s international 
role identity. Of course, the Kremlin has retained some of realist ideas ingrained in such 
multipolar models as great power management or balance of power. In the meantime, having 
borrowed the concept from the Western lexicon, Russia has semantically resignified it. This 
reformulation of the idea of multipolarity took two forms. Firstly, a variety of non-realist 
meanings was infused into this concept, including the issues of culture and identity 
(civilization approach). Second, under the influence of non-realist theories -  such as social 
constructivism and globalism -  multipolarity was adjusted to emerging post-international and
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post-sovereign milieu that encourages the activities of non-state actors, on the one hand, and 
the growing appeal of normative regulators, on the other.
My analysis in this paper confirmed that the Russian foreign policy discourse consists 
of a series of “mental maps” neither of which offers a more or less coherent vision of the idea 
of multipolarity which, constituting the cornerstone of Russian foreign policy, remains -  quite 
paradoxically -  among the least addressed in Russian foreign policy studies. Since 
multipolarity originates in the sphere of ideas, it would be quite logical to assume that at 
certain time there might be more than one pattern of multipolar arrangements. Each of them 
gives a different answer to the question of what is a pole -  a nation state, a region, a 
civilization, or perhaps an integrative construct like EU and CIS.
In the West, too, the concept of multipolarity has also reached far beyond its classical 
realist frames. In the traditions of Hedley Bull, one may assume that the mutipolarity debate 
contains a great deal of normative potential, since it is always about justice versus order 
(Zlobin 2008). For Chantal Mouffe, one of the key figures in critical theories, miltipolarity is 
connoted with pluralization of (regional) hegemonies in which agonistic type of conflicts (that 
one between mutually recognized rivals) would prevail over antagonistic (between enemies) 
(Mouffe 2009). Politically speaking, multipolarity is a challenge to all world actors: in today’s 
German foreign policy debate, for example, multipolarity may signify unilateralism (“going 
global alone”), which only sharpens the key question of “whether the EU can turn multipolar 
order into one that works through multilateral cooperation rather than spheres of influence” 
(Krastev and Leonard 2010: 22).
As far as Russia is concerned, it does not appear that any of the various versions of 
multipolarity described above has capabilities for undermining the Western hegemony. On the 
contrary, some of the discourse(s) of multipolarity could be quite compatible with the Western 
hegemonic power. Moscow lacks its own “global project” (Ryabov 2008) and, unsurprisingly, 
the integration with the Trans-Atlantic institutional structures remains the key priority for 
Russia. Thus, despite protesting against Ukrainian and Georgian engagement with NATO, 
Russia itself has restored cooperation with the alliance, particularly in Afghanistan. In spite of 
expressing some reservations about the Eastern Partnership program, Moscow continues to 
view strategic partnership with the EU as a top priority for Russia’s modernization. Thus, 
despite its sympathies to multipolarity, Russia is not keen to reverse the West-dominated 
structures of international relations, which explains why it so often adheres to a status quo 
type of policy thinking that ultimately pushes Russia to the margins of global politics (Igritskiy 
2006: 45-46). Harsh polemics with the West and sensitive reaction to external criticism of 
Russia only mask Moscow’s willingness to become part of the core coalition (Martyanov 
2008) constitutive of the international society-in-the-making. There are voices arguing that 
BRICS -  as an institution which owes its acronym to the world financial elite -  can be well 
inscribed into the future global strategy crafted by the West for engaging China, Brazil, India 
and Russia to the world-wide web of both normative and institutional interdependence 
(Pavlenko 2009: 29-30). Shanghai Cooperation Organization is not an anti-Western alliance 
either (Shutov 2009: 10-12).
Yet a deeper integration in the normative and institutional order crafted by the West, 
as my analysis has shown, is complicated by what may be dubbed cognitive dissonances 
between Russia and the EU. As the balance-of-power version of multipolarity illuminates,
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Russia’s foreign policy philosophy still tilts to a modernist understanding of sovereignty, while 
the EU seem to a much greater extent adhere to a “post-modernist” version of governance 
predicated upon the dispersal of sovereignty as the direct result of trans/cross/supra-national 
integration. Russia prefers to verbalize its messages addressed to the EU as interest-based 
speech acts with obvious pragmatic overtones, while European countries are inclined to 
formulate their worldviews in a more normative (identity- and value-based) language that 
inevitably contains the mechanisms of othering Russia, i.e. ascribing to her non-European 
characteristics of an alien power. It is obvious that EU is interested not in any type of strategic 
order, but in that one grounded in a set of liberal values -  democracy, the rule of law and 
individual freedom. Besides, Russia to a much larger extent than Europe is concerned about 
hard security problems. The EU focusing of soft security agenda leads to further 
marginalization of Russia that can’t justifiably expect to become a soft security partner of the 
EU unless it undertakes robust improvements of its democracy record and starts effectively 
protecting its population against corruption, red tape, environmental decay, etc. While 
Russia’s policies of multipolarity have strong connotations with sovereignty, self­
assertiveness and self-sufficiency, the competing EU logic embraces a different chain of 
meanings, to include integration, dispersal of sovereignty, norm-based identity, soft/human 
security, democratization through Europeanization as the key policy signifiers. Consequently, 
the two parties -  Russia and Europe -  still have different understandings of the nature of 
diversity and pluralism as constitutive features of international society they are embedded in. 
Besides, Russia tries to pursue the policies of multipolarity and multilateralism without having 
reliable friends and allies (Leviash 2010: 45-58), which was proven in August 2008 by the fact 
that Russia did not consult with Collective Security Treaty Organization members prior to 
launching its military operation against Georgia.
All this makes Russian efforts to push forward the multipolarity agenda -  in the variety 
of its formats -  ineffective. The problems Russia faces lie in the obvious lack of institutional 
support to what might be dubbed “inter-polarity”, or a structure of inter-dependent relationship 
between the major world powers. Neither bilateral relations with European capitals nor 
interest-based alliances in which Russia participates -  CSTO, SCO, and BRICS -  can 
institutionally match (or win emulation with) norm- and value-based organizations, NATO and 
EU included. As the demise of the Gaddafi regime in Libya in August 2011 demonstrated, 
NATO and EU -  despite serious intrinsic splits -  are still the dominating political forces 
capable of steering and streamlining the reshaping of crisis-ridden and strategically important 
regions.
However, even such a harsh conclusion deserves a glimpse of modest optimism. The 
debates on multipolarity in its multiple forms can be inscribed into a dichotomy of “politics of 
being” and “politics of becoming”. The “politics of being refer to existing configurations of 
power”, while the “politics of becoming” denotes “constant process of renewal” and shifts in 
identities and institutions (Bleiker 2009: 136-138). In this sense, the multipolarity discussions 
are very much related to the “politics of becoming”, since most of policy strategies they entail 
require not only accommodation to the changing global structures, but Russia’s active 
actorship. Yet, undoubtedly, “there are no free foreign policy pathways” (Kremeniuk 2004), 
and each of possible Russia’s strategies in a multipolar world has its political price to be paid. 
Domestically, it is indispensable that Russia undertakes deep internal reforms that would
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make the current institutional distance with the West less divisive. Internationally, Russia 
should concede that the policy of keeping status quo in the "frozen conflicts” in its 
neighborhood not only is economically unsustainable, but also damages the prospects of 
strategic partnership with the West. In other words, before charting different schemas of 
multipolarity, Russia needs a frank assessment of its own profile in the international society 
and a serious discussion on what kind of pole it is willing and capable to be.
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